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Some Evidence on the Empirical Significance 
of Credit Rationing 
Allen N. Berger 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
Gregory F. Udell 
New York University 
This paper examines the credit rationing debate using detailed con-
tract information on over one million commercial bank loans from 
1977 to 1988. While commercial loan rates are "sticky," consistent 
with rationing, this stickiness varies with loan contract terms in ways 
that are not predicted by equilibrium credit rationing theory. In 
addition, the proportion of new loans issued under commitment 
does not increase significantly when credit markets are tight, despite 
the fact that borrowers without commitments can be rationed 
whereas commitment borrowers are contractually insulated from 
rationing. Overall, the data suggest that equilibrium rationing is not 
a significant macroeconomic phenomenon. 
I. Introduction 
The subject of credit rationing is the focus of a considerable body of 
theoretical analysis. One reason for this interest is the potentially 
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of the Board of Governors or its staff. We would like to thank the editors and the 
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Charles Calomiris, Mark Carey, Lee Crabbe, Jean Dermine, Doug Diamond, John 
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Steve Sharpe, Joe Stiglitz, Anjan Thakor, Paul Wachtel, and Arthur Warga for helpful 
comments; and John Leusner, Peter Zemsky, and Bill Glahn for invaluable research 
assistance. 
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important role that credit rationing may play in the transmission of 
monetary policy. Advocates of the availability doctrine in the 19505 
suggested that monetary policy may operate in part through a ra-
tioning channel rather than an interest rate channel (e.g., Kareken 
1957; Scott 1957). This early work on credit rationing depended on 
ad hoc price rigidity arguments for its motivation. Later work by 
Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) demonstrated 
that credit rationing may persist in equilibrium using information-
based models. These papers spawned an entire generation of work 
on credit rationing based on an information-theoretic approach (e.g., 
Blinder and Stiglitz 1983; Wette 1983; Besanko and Thakor 1987 a, 
1987b; Williamson 1987). 
Despite these theoretical efforts, there remains little consensus 
about whether credit rationing is an economically significant phenom-
enon. Riley (1987) argued that credit rationing in a Stiglitz-Weiss 
environment would be limited to the marginal class of observably 
distinct risk pools. Stiglitz and Weiss (1987) countered that Riley's 
result was model-specific rather than general. Others have argued 
that contractual mechanisms may be available that mitigate the ra-
tioning problem. These mechanisms include loan commitments (see 
Boot and Thakor 1989; Sofianos, Wachtel, and Melnik 1990) and 
collateral (see Bester 1985; Chan and Kanatas 1985; Besanko and 
Thakor 1987 b). Given the reasoned arguments on all sides of this 
issue, it is clear that the significance or insignificance of credit ra-
tioning will have to be established empirically. 
unfortunately, empirical tests of the extant theories of equilibrium 
credit rationing have been difficult to conduct because of the paucity 
of micro data on the contractual terms of commercial bank loans. 
Nevertheless, some evidence has been generated on this issue using 
macro data. Most of this research has exploited the fact that a key 
testable implication of credit rationing is that the commercial loan 
rate is "sticky"; that is, it does not fully respond to changes in open-
market rates. Often this research has focused on the speed with which 
the loan rate acljusts to market rates. Goldfeld (1966) and Jaffee 
(1971) found that the commercial loan rate was slow to adjust to 
open-market rate changes. Slovin and Sushka (1983) later found that 
the commercial loan rate was less "sticky" than in Goldfeld's or Jaf-
fee's results and took this as evidence against the credit rationing 
hypothesis, although their result may be subject to an alternative in-
terpretation. I Using a different approach, King (1986, p. 298) found 
1 Slovin and Sushka regressed the average commercial loan interest rate on the 
contemporaneous value and two quarterly lags of the commercial paper rate, using 
nine different specifications of other variables (their table 1, p. 1590). The coefficient 
of the second lag term was statistically significant at the 1 percent level in six of nine 
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"mixed support" for the credit rationing hypothesis. Sofianos et al. 
(1990) used time-series techniques and found evidence consistent 
with credit rationing, but only for loans funded without commit-
ments. As discussed below, however, their results may also be subject 
to an alternative interpretation. 
This paper differs from previous empirical work on credit ra-
tioning of commercial loans in that individual loan data, rather than 
macro data, are employed. The micro data approach permits us to 
analyze the empirical implications of rationing models that relate to 
specific features of bank loan contracts and to examine the behavior 
of the commercial loan market at the individual loan level. The Fed-
eral Reserve's Survey of Terms of Bank Lending data set contains 
contract information on over 1,000,000 commercial loans made from 
1977 to 1988.2 
Consistent with previous studies, we find evidence ofloan rate stick-
iness. In contrast to previous studies, however, we do not assume that 
this necessarily reflects credit rationing. While sticky loan pricing is 
consistent with the rationing hypothesis, it is not by itself sufficient 
evidence of it. One alternative explanation is that banks may offer 
implicit interest rate insurance to risk-averse repeat borrowers in the 
form of below-market rates during periods of high market rates, for 
which the banks are later compensated when market rates are low 
(see Fried and Howitt 1980). Another possibility is that stickiness may 
be the result of loan recontracting between banks and companies 
experiencing financial distress when market interest rates are high. 
To avoid bankruptcy costs, banks may be willing to renegotiate and 
grant new loans at concessionary rates to such companies at these 
times (see Sharpe 1991). 
In this paper, we develop a number of empirical tests that are 
capable of differentiating credit rationing from alternative explana-
tions of price stickiness in commercial lending. We examine how loan 
rate stickiness varies across several loan contract features that may be 
related to rationing behavior. In addition, a more direct and defini-
tive test of the quantitative effects of rationing focuses on the propor-
cases. They concluded that "movements in interest rates are fully and quickly transmit-
ted to commercial loan customers" (p. 1595), but an alternative conclusion is that the 
transmission mechanism takes at least two quarters and perhaps more. 
2 There have also been a number of studies of credit rationing in the mortgage 
market. Duca and Rosenthal (1991) examined the behavior of the ratio of Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA) mortgages to total mortgages in the "post-disinter-
mediation era," arguing that FHA mortgages are less vulnerable to rationing because 
they are government guaranteed. They found evidence of "default-risk induced" ra-
tioning in the form of a positive relationship between FHA market share and the 
spread of AAA- over A-rated corporate bonds. See also Jaffee and Rosen (1979), 
Hendershott (1980), and Rosen and Rosen (1980). 
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tion of new loans that are issued under commitment. If rationing 
were widespread, this proportion would necessarily increase when 
credit markets are tight because borrowers without commitments can 
be rationed whereas commitment borrowers are contractually insu-
lated from rationing. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the data and 
the tests to be performed, and Section III gives the empirical results 
of those tests. Section IV presents conclusions. 
II. Data and Test Descriptions 
Our primary data source is the Federal Reserve's Survey of Terms 
of Bank Lending. Each quarter from 1977: 1 to 1988: 2, approxi-
mately 340 banks listed the individual characteristics of every domes-
tic commercial and industrial loan and construction and land devel-
opment loan made during one or more days of the first week of the 
second month of the quarter. The sample includes the 48 largest 
banks in the nation in terms of commercial and industrial lending 
plus 292 other banks chosen to represent the strata of smaller banks. 
Banks that withdrew from the sample were replaced with banks of 
similar size and other characteristics. In all, 460 different banks are 
represented in the sample. 
Table 1 gives a description of each variable, as well as its sample 
mean, standard deviation, and number of independent observations. 3 
The data set is quite large, with 1,103,933 independent observations 
on the terms of individual loans taken from 460 different banks and 
46 time periods. The bank and macro variables, which have fewer 
independent observations, were allocated to their corresponding loan 
observations. 
Tests of Loan Rate Stickiness 
The "stickiness tests" involve regressing the loan rate premium 
(PREM) against measures of real or nominal rates, the key loan con-
tract variables, and a number of control variables for characteristics 
of the loan contract, the issuing bank, and the macro environment. 
For fixed-rate loans, PREM is the annualized (nominal) loan interest 
rate less the (nominal) rate on a Treasury security of comparable 
duration. For floating-rate loans, we ideally would subtract the Trea-
sury rate with duration equal to the expected repricing interval, but 
this cannot be precisely determined from the data. As an approxima-
3 A small number of loans (fewer than I percent) were deleted because of data 
problems. See Berger and Udell (1989) for details. 
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tion, we assume that all floating rate loans are expected to be repriced 
within 4 weeks and use the Treasury rate with duration equal to the 
minimum of the loan duration and 4 weeks.4 
The primary exogenous variables are the comparable Treasury 
rate for each loan (TRA TE) and its square (TRA TE2), which mea-
sure open-market rates and summarize credit market conditions rele-
vant to rationing. Note that the use of PREM and the TRATE vari-
ables allows for nonlinearities in the term structure of interest rates, 
which would not be the case if the loan rate were used instead as the 
dependent variable and a single representative Treasury rate and 
the loan duration were included as regressors. A second measure of 
credit market tightness is the dummy variable CRUNCH, which takes 
on the value one for quarters in which Eckstein and Sinai (1986) 
determined that a credit crunch was operative. This variable allows 
for additional nonlinear effects of credit market conditions and allows 
us to focus particularly on the time periods in which rationing may 
have been most likely to occur:" 
The analysis was conducted using both real and nominal interest 
rates as exogenous variables, denoted by TRA TER and TRA TEN, 
respectively. This represents a break from the empirical literature, 
which generally considers only nominal rates. Note that the depen-
dent variable PREM does not depend on real versus nominal consid-
erations, since it is the difference between two rates of the same dura-
tion. The use of the real rate (TRA TER) more closely corresponds 
with the theoretical literature on credit rationing, which essentially 
describes a real phenomenon. Unfortunately, use of the real rate 
suffers in practice because inflationary expectations are unknown. In 
estimating inflationary expectations, we tried models of both rational 
and adaptive expectations as well as the Livingston Survey data. Since 
the results were similar across approaches, we simply report the re-
sults from using the Livingston data here. Use of the nominal rate 
(TRA TEN) has the virtue of largely avoiding mismeasurement prob-
lems, but it may fail to capture effectively the changes in credit market 
tightness. However, to the extent that some economic agents react to 
4 For the 4-week rate, we used the average of the bid-asked spread in the secondary 
Treasury bill market. The other Treasury data used were new issue (when available) 
or secondary market quotes of 3- 6-, and 12-month bills and 2-, 3-, 5-, 7-, 10-, and 
30-year bonds and notes. Durations were computed for these maturities, and the rates 
for all other durations were determined by interpolation and extrapolation. A number 
of other methods of computing the risk premia on floating-rate loans were tried, but 
the reported results were not qualitatively altered. 
5 Eckstein and Sinai defined credit crunches as "periods when financial distress pro-
duces sharp discontinuities in flow of funds and spending and when the financial 
strains include tight monetary policy, much lessened availability of money and credit, 
sharp rises of interest rates, and deteriorating balance sheets for households, busi-
nesses, and financial institutions" (p. 41). 
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TABLE 1 
DATA USED IN REGRESSIONS 
~....::=;;;-:==~:::::.' .. ===-~ . .::-==-:-~=---==------==...---- ----...::..=--.::::::.--- ==---==--=-==---- ---"~--::::::-:::--:--.::-~=:==:::::.=---- .. 
PREM 
TRATER 
TRATEN 
CRUNCH 
COMMIT 
FLOAT 
COLI-AI' 
Annualized loan interest rate minus the rate for a Treasury seCli-
rity of equal duration, except that floating-rate loans over 4 
weeks use the 4-week Treasury rate 
Real interest rate on a comparable Treasury security for the indi-
vidual loan (as in PREM), calculated using the Livingston Sur-
vey of intlationary expectations 
Nominal interest rate on a comparable Treasury security for the 
individual loan (as in PREM) 
Equals one for quarters in which a credit crunch was operative, 
using Eckstein and Sinai (1986): 1978:2-1980:1, 1981:1-
1981:4 
Equals one if the loan is under commitment 
Equals one if the loan is floating-rate 
Equals one if the loan is secured (collateralized) 
Mean 
.0419 
.0247 
.0861 
.2524 
.5305 
.6lf>2 
.5760 
Number of 
Standard Independent 
Deviation Observations 
----_._, --.- ._------ -~----.--------.-
.0217 1,103,933 
.0259 1,103,933 
.0332 1.103,9~~3 
.4344 46 
.4991 1,103,933 
.4866 1,103,933 
.4941 1,103,933 
Copyright © 1992. All rights reserved.
SIZE Real size of the loan (LNSIZE = 10g[SIZEj used in regressions) 559.4 E3 369.1 E4 1,103,933 
DURATION Duration of the loan in years; the present-value weights use the .4106 .6785 1,103,933 
initial loan interest rate (LNDURATION = 10g[DURATIONj 
used in the regressions) 
DEMAND Equals one if the loan has no stated maturity (i.e., a demand .2618 .4396 1,103,933 
note) 
OVERNIGHT Equals one if the loan is a I-day (i.e., overnight) loan; set to zero .0126 .1113 599,387 
prior to August 1982, when day of month maturities became 
available 
SINGFAM Equals one for a single-family construction and development .0455 .2084 1,103,933 
loan 
MULTIFAM Equals one for a multifamily construction and development loan .0070 .0831 1,103,933 
NON RES Equals one for a nonresidential construction and development .0270 .1622 1,103,933 
loan 
LNBANKASSETS Natural logarithm of the total assets of the bank 15.1198 1.6985 6,293 
GNPGROWTH Real GNP growth over the previous quarter (%) .7630 1.0120 46 
.... UNEMPLOY Unemployment rate (%) 7.2077 1.2826 46 0 TIME Time trend for the 46 dates (1, ... ,46) 24.3343 13.6733 46 (,}l 
(.>0 BANKDUMMIES Dummies for all sample banks were included in every regression 460 
NOIT.-All dollar figures are constant 1987 dollars except as noted. 
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changes in nominal prices because of nominal price stickiness in out-
put or factor markets or because of difficulties in contracting in real 
rates, nominal rate stickiness may still be indicative of credit rationing. 
In contrast to some of the empirical literature (e.g., Goldfe1d 1966; 
Jaffee 1971; Slovin and Sushka 1983), we use only contemporaneous 
open-market interest rates and do not include lags. In our opinion, 
this provides a cleaner test ofthe Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981) models of equilibrium credit rationing. These are 
one-period models of lender responses to current credit market con-
ditions. Therefore, the current comparable Treasury rate for the loan 
and its square seem to be good summary statistics for the conditions 
relevant to the setting of rates and rationing policies on newl)' issued 
loans. Thus the model tests whether, in equilibrium, banks raise loan 
rates equally with increases in risk-free open-market rates or whether 
they ration loan funds, not how long it takes to reach equilibrium. 
In some of the regression models, the credit market tightness vari-
ables TRATE and CRUNCH are interacted with three key contract 
variables, COMMIT, COLLAT, and FLOAT, in order to determine 
whether loans with different contract terms exhibit different degrees 
of stickiness. Under a loan commitment contract, the lender agrees 
to extend credit at the borrower's request up to some prespecified 
amount over a given time period. Commitments explicitly provide 
insurance against credit rationing because they preclude the bank 
from denying a funding request on the basis of general market condi-
tions (see Melnik and Plaut 1986; Sofianos et al. 1990).5 Indeed, a 
recent loan officer survey (Board of Governors 1988) indicated that 
"protection against credit crunches" ranked only behind minimizing 
transactions costs as a motivation for commitments. Therefore, any 
observed stickiness on commitment loans cannot reflect credit ra-
tioning of commitment borrowers, since they are contractually insu-
lated from rationing. 
The difference in stickiness between commitment and noncommit-
ment loan rates may also reflect the difference in relative magnitudes 
of information problems between commitment and noncommitment 
borrowers and in the power of micro contracting to solve these prob-
lems. A study of loan commitments found commitment loans to be 
safer on average than noncommitment loans, suggesting that commit-
ment borrowers may have fewer than average information problems 
6 Many commitments have escape clauses that permit the lender to abrogate the 
contract in the event that the borrower's condition has suffered "material adverse 
change." These clauses by necessity are triggered by changes in the observable quality 
of the borrower. Therefore, commitments with escape clauses still provide insurance 
against Stiglitz and Weiss-type rationing, which is driven by unobservable differences 
in borrower quality. 
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(see Avery and Berger 1991), although in some tangentially related 
research, commitments are not negatively related to all the risk mea-
sures (see Berger and Udell 1990, 1992). The nature of the commit-
ment contract or the commitment selection process might also at-
tenuate the kinds of information problems that have typically been 
associated with credit rationing (see Boot, Thakor, and Udell 1987; 
Kanatas 1987; Thakor and Udell 1987; Berkovitch and Greenbaum 
1991). Thus if information problems are creating the stickiness, it is 
likely that commitment loan rates would be less sticky, reflecting 
fewer information problems for commitment borrowers or the atten-
uation of these problems by the commitments. 
Collateral has been found to be associated with higher risk and 
therefore may be associated with more information problems and 
loan rate stickiness (see Berger and Udell 1990). However, the pledg-
ing of collateral can also mitigate information problems, reducing 
the associated stickiness (see Bester 1985; Chan and Kanatas 1985; 
Besanko and Thakor 1987a, 1987b). Thus rates on secured loans may 
be more or less sticky than unsecured loans. Finally, floating-rate 
loans may have a different degree of stickiness than fixed-rate loans 
because of any sorting associated with the degree of fixity in rate 
repricing or differences related to the sharing of interest rate risk. 
Tests of the Proportions of Loans with Different 
Contract Features 
The "proportions tests" examine the testable implications of credit 
rationing that relate to how the proportions of new loans with differ-
ent contract features vary with credit market tightness. The method-
ology is to form logit models of the probabilities that one dollar being 
lent for 1 year will (i) be under commitment, (ii) be secured, or (iii) be 
floating rate. Computing limitations rule out the possibility of using 
observation-by-observation logit estimations, so grouped logit models 
were formed by combining the loans made by a given bank at a given 
time. For every variable for which data were available by individual 
loan, a weighted average across all the loans for the bank-date combi-
nation was formed, with the weights being proportional to the size 
and duration of the individual loans. In this way, each loan is repre-
sented in proportion to its contribution to the bank's future loan 
portfolio.7 The dependent variables were also transformed into log-
odds ratio form In[Y/(1 - Y)], where Y is the size-duration weighted 
proportion of new loans with the characteristic being examined (e.g., 
7 For example, a $5,000 loan with 2 years' duration receives 10 times the weight of 
a $1,000, I-year loan. 
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COMMIT). This form preserves the functional relationship of the 
observation-by-observation logit form but loses some information by 
averaging. Each regression was estimated by weighted least squares 
to avoid heteroskedasticity problems.8 
The COMMIT proportions test provides a relatively direct and 
definitive test of the quantitative significance of credit rationing. If 
credit rationing is economically important, then the proportion of 
new bank loans made under commitment must increase substantially 
with open-market rates and credit market tightness. Simply put, ra-
tioning decreases the quantity of noncommitment lending from what 
it otherwise would have been but cannot reduce the quantity of com-
mitment lending because of contractual constraints. 9 Two other fac-
tors related to information problems may also induce a positive rela-
tionship between open-market rates and the commitment proportion 
even if no rationing actually occurs: (i) borrowers may avoid rationing 
by switching funding from noncommitment sources to existing com-
mitment lines (if not deterred by commitment covenants) or (ii) more 
borrowers may purchase commitment contracts when the probability 
of being rationed is increased. lo It follows that a virtual necessary, 
but not sufficient, condition for rationing to be an important macro-
economic phenomenon is that the proportion of new loans made 
under commitment increases substantially when open-market interest 
rates rise. 
The COLLAT and FLOAT proportions tests are intended to reveal 
the extent to which rationing, if it occurs, affects borrowers with 
different contract terms differently. For instance, how the COLLAT 
proportion reacts to changes in open-market interest rates may reveal 
the net effect of (i) the difference in information problems for se-
cured versus unsecured borrowers, (ii) the extent to which collateral 
arrangements solve these problems, and (iii) the extent to which bor-
8 Each observation was divided by the estimated standard deviation of its error term, 
({(IfY) + [If(1 - Y)J}/n)1/2, where n is the sum of the size-duration weights for all the 
loans embodied in the bank-date observation. 
9 The only case in which rationing would not be reflected in the proportion of loans 
made under commitment would occur if rationing were demand-induced and the 
increased demand came only from noncommitment borrowers. In this case, there 
would be excess demand for noncommitment loans, but the quantities of both commit-
ment and noncommitment loans would remain constant. Although possible, this case 
seems quite unlikely. Increases in aggregate demand are generally associated with 
increased funding under working capital commitment lines to finance inventory re-
plenishment, so that, if anything, the commitment proportion would increase. 
10 This latter argument assumes that there are some fixed costs associated with issu-
ing commitments that do not generally increase with the probability of takedown. An 
example might be the expected costs associated with the difficulty of writing a "material 
adverse change clause" that adequately protects the bank against borrower credit dete-
rioration. Without fixed costs, risk-averse borrowers would always purchase commit-
ments from risk-neutral banks. 
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rowers who do not pledge collateral when rates are low may pledge 
collateral when rates are high to avoid rationing. 
Both the stickiness and the proportions regressions include a num-
ber of additional loan-specific, macro, and bank variables as control 
variables. The loan-specific contract variable LNSIZE accounts for 
the possibility of scale economies in lending and the possibility that 
loan size may also be associated with credit risk; LNDURATION 
accounts for the possibility of a nonrisk term premium component 
of the dependent variable or another scale economy in lending; DE-
MAND accounts for differences in risk created by the bank's option 
to call a loan and any sorting effects related to this option. The 
OVERNIGHT, SINGFAM, MULTIFAM, and NONRES variables 
are exogenous factors that may provide information about the type 
of borrower or loan. The macro variables, GNPGROWTH, UNEM-
PLOY, TIME, and the square of TIME, are included to control for 
the effects of non-credit market cycles, changes in aggregate risk, 
and other trends that may be correlated with credit market condi-
tions. The bank variable LNBANKASSETS is included to account 
for the possibility of segmented markets in which different-sized 
banks have access to different types of borrowers. Finally, every re-
gression contains dummy variables for every bank in the sample to 
control for systematic differences in pricing caused by the presence 
of other pricing elements (e.g., up-front fees or compensating bal-
ances), as well as differences in regulatory and competitive environ-
ments across banks. The use of the individual bank dummies essen-
tially provides the strongest set of controls for any type of stable bank 
differences that can be specified. 
III. Empirical Results 
Stickiness Test Results 
Tables 2 and 3 show the results of the stickiness tests. The loan rate 
premia (PREM) are regressed on real and nominal rates, respectively, 
as well as loan contract terms and macro and bank control variables, 
although the coefficients of the control variables are not shown here 
(see Berger and Udell [1989J for these coefficients). All coefficients 
and derived statistics (including the coefficients of the control vari-
ables) are statistically significant because of the unusually large num-
ber of observations. The regression shown in column 1 of table 2 has 
as regressors the real Treasury rate appropriate for the individual 
loan (TRA TER) and its square (TRA TER2), but excludes CRUNCH 
and any interaction terms. The individual coefficients of TRA TER 
and TRA TER2 are difficult to interpret because the variables move 
Copyright © 1992. All rights reserved.
TABLE 2 
REGRESSIONS OF LOAN RATE PREMIA (PREM) ON REAL INTEREST RATES, LOAN CONTRACT TERMS, AND CONTROL VARIABLES 
_==: __ .,--=:.~-=:= 'cc==.--=-= 
I- I- t- t- t-
Coefficicnt Statistic Coefficient Statistic Cocfficient Statistic Coefficicnt Statistic Coefficicnt Statistic 
--_.-._-_._----
- -~- .. ------- . --"'--~--
Variable (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
---_._---- --------- ---------, ... _--- ------ - .. -
TRATER - .4912** -239.3 - .5973** -249.0 - .6452** -259.8 -.5392** -220.5 - .5930** -234.9 
TRATER2 3.4176** 150.7 3.6801** 161.5 3.8687** 169.4 3.6795** 162.0 3.8555** 169.5 
.... 
CRUNCH -2.2E-4* -2 .. 0 .0044** -46.2 
0 TR-COM-FLOA T .1289** 76.7 .1089** 64.2 
(J1 TR-COM-FIXED .0379** 17.2 .0288** 13.1 00 
TR-NOCOM-FLOAT .1436** 75.9 .1292*' 67.9 
TR-COL-FLOA T .0740** 41.6 .0694** 38.7 
TR-COL-FIXED - .1062*' -52.9 -.0971** -48.5 
TR-NOCOL-FLOAT .0842** 43.1 .0633** 32.1 
CR-COM-FLOAT .0112** 107.8 
CR-COM-FIXED .0060** 46.9 
CR-NOCOM-Fl.OA T .0085** 73.5 
CR-COL-FLOAT .0043** 39.1 
CR-COL-FIXEU - .0066** -57,2 
CR-NOCOL-FLOAT .0074** 60.9 
COMMIT -.0030** -71.1 -.0032'* -76.1 - .0031 ** -74.1 
COLLAT 9.9E -4** 25.0 .0011** 27.S .0010** 25.9 
FLOAT .00SI** 17S.1 
C;OM-FLOA'r .0015** 20.8 - .0016** -20.6 
COM-FIXED .0013** -50.7 -.0062*' 68.4 
NOC;OM-FLOA'I' .0040*' 5:1.0 .0012** 15.4 
COL-FLOA'l' .0061** 86.3 .00:) 1** 64.5 
COL-FIXED 6.7E-4** 8.8 .0026*' 31.0 
Copyright © 1992. All rights reserved.
.... 
0 
(,)1 
<.0 
NOCOL-FLOAT 
R2 .28 .28 .29 
.0030** 
.29 
Simulated Effects of an Increase in Credit Market Tightness: 
38.0 .0014** 
.30 
16.5 
Predicted Change in PREM and t-Statistic from a Doubling of TRATER from Its Mean (.02472) for Different Categories of Loans 
COM- or COL-
FLOAT LOANS - .0048** -149.8 -.0062** -182.3 -.0048** -145.2 - .0059** - 171.7 
COM-ORCOL-
FIXED LOANS 
-.0059** -249.6 -.0071** -142.0 -.0081** -160.4 -.0092** -218.2 -.0100** -230.3 NOCOM-OR 
NOCOL-FLOA T LNS -.0045** -116.2 -.0057** -140.9 - .0045** -120.8 -.0060** - 153.7 
NOCOM-OR 
NOCOL-FIXED LNS -.0080** -228.1 -.0089** -240.9 - .0066** -173.6 -.0076** -192.8 
Predicted Change in PREM and t-Statistic from a Credit Crunch (CRUNCH) for Different Categories of Loans 
COM-ORCOL-
FLOAT LOANS .0109** 117.4 .0086** 93.5 
COM-ORCOL-
FIXED LOANS .0058** 48.1 -.0023** -22.8 
NOCOM-OR 
NOCOL-FLOAT LNS .0082** 77.5 .0117** 1l0.5 
NOCOM-OR 
NOCOL-FIXED LNS -2.2E-4* -2.5 .0044** 46.2 
Non;,-Each observation represents the terms of an individual loan contract. Number of observations is 1,103,933. Intercepts were included for each bank in the sample, and the R2 ,s reflect 
the proportion of variance explained after these intercepts. Also included but not shown are the control variables LNSIZE, LNDURA TION, DEMAND, OVERNIGHT, SINGFAM, MULTIF AM, 
NONRES, LNBANKASSETS, GNPGROWTH, UNEMPLOY, TIME, and TIME2. 
* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level, two-sided. 
** Statistically Significant at the 1 percent level, two-sided. 
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TABLE 3 
REGRESSIONS OF LOAN RATE PREMIA (PREM) ON NOMINAL INTEREST RATES, LOAN CONTRACT TERMS, AND CONTROL VARIABLES 
-.-.:;~~-::::~- -=--.:=:-==-----;;:~== 
t- t- t- t- t-
Coefficient Statistic Coefficient Statistic Coefficient Statistic Coefficient Statistic Coefficient Statistic 
-- -------
Variable (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
----- ---~ -"-----_ .. _-
TRATEN - .2619** -55.1 - .4486*' -90.7 - .4262** -85.9 -.3437** -69.8 - .3399** -68.7 
... 
TRATEN2 .5819** 29.8 .8520*' 43.9 .7787** 40.0 .7624** 39.4 .6945** 35.8 
0 CRUNCH -.0012** -12.6 .0016*' 16.0 
Ol TR-COM-FLOA T .1834** 131.8 .1129*' 89.3 0 
TR-COM-FIXED .0946** 51.2 .0699** 33.8 
TR-NOCOM-FLOAT .1778** 113.9 .1550*' 86.0 
TR-COL-FLOAT .0865** 59.1 .0775*' 46.1 
TR-COL-FIXED - .1296** -76.8 - .1046'* -55.4 
TR-NOCOL-FLOA'I' .1167** 73.3 .0898** 18.4 
CR-COM-FLOAr .0065** 53.5 
CR-COM-FIXED .0010*' 26.9 
CR-NOCOM-FLOAT .0037** 27.5 
CR-COL-FLOAT .0015** 1!.7 
CR-COL-FIXED -.0039** -29.2 
CR-NOCOL-FLOAT .0010** 28.0 
COMMIT -67.8 -- .0()3 1** 72.6 - .0030*' -71.1 
COLLAT 9.1E-4** 22.4 9.6E-4** 23.H H.9E-1** 22.2 
FLOAT .0088** 186.9 
COM-FLOAT .- .0113** - 80.5 -.. 0096** -66.1 
COM-FIXED ·-.OI2:F* -68.5 -.OIH** -62.5 
NOCOM-FLOAT .. 0082** -53.0 - .0075** -46.7 
COL-FLOAT 9.8E-1·· 6.7 .0013" 8.8 
Copyright © 1992. All rights reserved.
..... 
o 
01 
..... 
COL-FIXED 
NOCOL-FLOAT 
R2 
COM- or COL-
FLOAT LOANS 
COM-OR COL-
FIXED LOANS 
NOCOM-OR 
NOCOL-FLOAT LNS 
NOCOM-OR 
NOCOL-FIXED LNS 
COM-ORCOL-
FLOAT LOANS 
COM-ORCOL-
FIXED LOANS 
NOCOM-OR 
NOCOL-FLOAT LNS 
NOCOM-OR 
NOCOL-FIXED LNS 
NOTE.-See note to table 2. 
.24 
-.0037** 
.0094** 57.1 .00S4** 50.2 
- .0049** - 30.S - .0035** -21.3 
.25 .26 .26 .26 
Simulated Effects of an Increase in Credit Market Tightness: 
Predicted Change in PREM and t-Statistic from Increasing TRATEN from Its Mean (.08608) 
by .02472 for Different Categories of Loans 
- .0024** -68.7 - .0032** -84.0 - .0026** -75.6 -.0031** -81.2 
-120.1 -.0046** -96.6 -.0050** -97.2 -.0080*· -185.5 -.0076** -165.6 
-.0025** -65.S -.0029** -67.3 -.0019** -49.8 -.0028** -65.5 
-.0069** -179.4 -.0067** -165.4 -.0048** -119.7 -.0050** -1lS.1 
Predicted Change in PREM and I-Statistic from a Credit Crunch (CRUNCH) for Different Categories of Loans 
.0053** 
.0028** 
.0025** 
-.0012** 
50.9 
20.6 
20.8 
-12.6 
.0031 ** 
-.0022** 
.0056** 
.0016** 
30.6 
-20.2 
46.3 
16.0 
** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level, two~sided. 
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together, but their coefficients have opposite signs. To obtain a more 
meaningful summary statistic that measures the effects of a tight-
ening of the credit market, we computed the predicted change in 
PREM that would be caused by a doubling of TRA TER from its mean 
(i.e., from 2.472 percent to 4.944 percent). The predicted change 
and its t-statistic are shown in column 1 of the bottom section of the 
table. The - .0059 predicted change suggests that when real rates 
double, the premium over the risk-free rate drops 59 basis points. II 
This represents a substantial degree of stickiness in loan rates when 
compared to the historical average bank return on assets, which is 
less than 100 basis points. The elasticity of PREM with respect to 
TRA TER evaluated at the sample mean is also substantial, - .19. 
The regression shown in column 1 of table 3 repeats the experi-
ment using nominal Treasury rates (TRA TEl'\, TRA TEN2) in place 
of the real rates. When nominal rates are increased by the same 
amount as the real rates (2.472 percent), the measured stickiness is 
somewhat less, 37 basis points. This becomes much larger, 99 basis 
points (not shown), if nominal rates are instead doubled from their 
relatively large sample mean value (8.608 percent). We consider the 
lesser of these two increases to be more reliable, since twice the mean 
nominal rate is well above the dense part of the TRA TEN distribu-
tion. The elasticity of PREM with respect to the nominal rate evalu-
ated at the mean is - .34, which exceeds (in absolute value) the real 
rate elasticity because of the larger mean of TRA TEI'\. 12 
Figure 1 illustrates the relationships between the loan rate premia 
and Treasury rates over time. The solid lines in the figure connect 
the size-duration weighted averages of PREM across all loans for 
each time period; the broken lines connect the weighted averages of 
TRATER in figure la and TRATEN in figure lb. As shown, PREM 
is very highly negatively correlated with both real and nominal rates 
over the period from about 1979: 4 to 1982 : 4 but is not highly related 
for the remainder of the sample. During this period, rates were at 
highs relative to the recent past, then fell and rose again to their 
sample peaks. The strong negative relationship during this period is 
consistent with credit rationing but is also consistent with the alterna-
tive theories of rate stickiness. 
By construction, the stickiness illustrated thus far is the same for 
II The formula for this change is (2f.l - f.l)~1 + [(2f.l)2 - f.l21~2' where f.l is the 
sample mean of TRA TE and ~I and ~2 are the coefficients of TRA TE and TRA TE2, 
respectively. 
12 Kote that the stickiness results would be essentially unchanged if the second-order 
terms (TRATE2) were not included in the regressions. Excluding these terms gives 
measured drops in PREM from changing TRA TE of 53, 31, and 107 basis points in 
place of the reported 59, 37, and 99 basis points, respectively. 
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FIG. I.-Bank loan premia and Treasury rates of the same duration (1977:1-
1988:2): a, real Treasury rates; b, nominal Treasury rates. 
all types of loans since TRA TE was not interacted with any other 
variables in the regressions. However, as discussed above, most of the 
interesting testable implications apply to relative stickiness, which we 
turn to next. The regression shown in column 2 of table 2 reproduces 
tht; regression in column 1 but allows stickiness to differ across loans 
in four categories of commitment and floating-rate status. The 
dummy variables COMMIT and FLOAT are replaced by three inter-
action terms, COM-FLOAT, COM-FIXED, and NOCOM-FLOAT, 
and these variables are interacted with TRA TE, denoted by TR-
Copyright © 1992. All rights reserved.
JOURN"AL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
COM-FLOAT, TR-COM-FIXED, and TR-1\OCOM-FLOAT. This 
allows the four commitment-rate type combinations (including the 
unspecified category NOCOM-FIXED) to have independent degrees 
of stickiness. The results in column 2 suggest that all four categories 
of loans have sticky rates. When real rates are doubled, commitment 
loans have roughly the same stickiness as noncommitment loans for 
a given rate type (48 vs. 45 basis points for floating-rate and 71 vs. 
80 basis points for fixed-rate), but floating-rate loans are substantially 
less sticky than fixed-rate loans for a given commitment status (48 
vs. 71 basis points for commitment and 45 vs. 80 basis points for 
noncommitment). Column 3 replicates column 2 but adds the variable 
CRUNCH and its interactions with the other variables as well. The 
results show that during periods designated as credit crunches, the 
PREM actually increased for three of the four categories, contrary to 
the expectation under credit rationing that premia would be lower 
during credit crunches. In addition, an interaction term between 
TRA TER and CRUNCH added to the regression (not shown) had a 
positive coefficient, suggesting that the responsiveness of loan rates 
to open-market rates is greater during credit crunches, again contrary 
to expectations if borrowers are rationed during crunches. These 
findings suggest either that the observed stickiness in the other re-
gressions is largely unrelated to credit rationing or that the Eckstein-
Sinai credit crunches do not correspond well with rationing periods. 13 
The results for nominal rates shown in the corresponding columns 
in table 3 largely replicate those in table 2, with the exception that 
commitment loans display somewhat less stickiness than noncom mit-
ment loans. 
The finding that stickiness on commitment loans is substantial and 
is nearly the same as that on noncommitment loans of the same rate 
type suggests that the empirical literature that equated stickiness with 
credit rationing may be misleading. A large portion of all rate sticki-
ness is accounted for by commitment loans and cannot be associated 
with credit rationing because commitment contracts preclude ration-
ing. In addition, if the stickiness is caused by Stiglitz and Weiss-type 
information problems, we would expect rates on commitment loans to 
be less sticky than those on noncommitment loans, given the empirical 
results cited earlier and corroborated here that commitments are as-
sociated with higher than average quality borrowers who likely have 
relatively few information problems. 14 Therefore, the finding of 
13 One possible nonrationing explanation for the positive relationship between loan 
rate premia and CRUNCH is that CRUNCH may be coincident with periods of in-
creased aggregate risk and, therefore, higher risk premia on bank loans. 
14 The rate premium is lower on commitment loans, ceteris paribus. by 30 basis 
points when the regression in col. I of table 2 is used, suggesting less compensation 
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near-equality of stickiness between commitment and noncommitment 
loan rates suggests that information problems are not the dominant 
reasons for rate stickiness. 
The finding that stickiness is much more prevalent on fixed-rate 
than floating-rate loans has no direct implications for credit rationing 
but may be consistent with an alternative hypothesis. If lenders pro-
vide implicit interest rate insurance, this result suggests that they do 
so through fixed-rate loan contracts that insulate the borrowers from 
rate variation over the life of the contract. 15 
The results shown in columns 4 and 5 of tables 2 and 3 replicate the 
models shown in columns 2 and 3, respectively, except that COLLAT 
replaces COMMIT in all the interaction terms. The results again 
show that rates on fixed-rate loans are stickier than those on floating-
rate loans. They also again show that stickiness is generally less during 
CRUNCH periods, contrary to the predictions of the extant theories 
of credit rationing. The new result is that secured loans exhibit more 
rate stickiness than other loans with the same floating- or fixed-rate 
status in most cases, although the difference is often slight. 16 If infor-
mation problems are driving the rate stickiness, then the slightly 
greater stickiness of secured loan rates suggests that borrowers who 
pledge collateral have more information problems than other bor-
rowers (consistent with their greater risk discussed above) and that 
the process of pledging collateral does not fully offset these problems. 
We also reran the main regressions using rates of growth of aggre-
gate loans in place of the TRA TE variables as alternative measures 
of credit market tightness (not shown). The results suggested that 
increasing credit tightness by reducing loan growth from its mean to 
zero actually results in slightly higher loan rate premia, contrary to 
the implications of credit rationing. The fact that loan rate premia 
do not consistently decline with alternative measures of credit market 
tightness (CRUNCH and reduced loan growth) suggests that ra-
tioning does not play an important role during periods of overall 
credit market tightness. This makes it more difficult to argue that 
credit rationing is an important macroeconomic phenomenon. 
The stickiness data may also be used to examine Riley's (1987) 
version of credit rationing, which suggests that rationing would be 
for risk on commitment loans, consistent with Avery and Berger (1991). Similar results 
hold when the other regressions are used. 
15 Some of the observed stickiness on fixed·rate loans may occur because the rates 
have been locked in by fixed-rate commitment contracts issued in the past. Unfortu-
nately, this cannot be determined from the data, which have information on whether 
the loan is fixed-rate, but not on whether the commitment is fixed-rate. 
16 This comes from comparing the effects of COL-FLOAT with NOCOL-FLOAT 
and COL-FIXED with NOCOL-FIXED. 
Copyright © 1992. All rights reserved.
1066 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
substantial only for the marginal class of observably distinct risk pools. 
If differences across rate premia at a given time largely reflect risk 
differentials, then the stickiness results shown in tables 2 and 3 would 
hold primarily for the loans with the highest premia (i.e., highest 
risk) under Riley's hypothesis. To examine this possibility, the data 
were ordered by PREM for each time period, separated into quintiles, 
and grouped with data from the same quintiles from all the other 
time periods. Rerunning the regressions separately for each quintile 
group showed that the stickiness prevailed over all five quintiles. 
When a difference appeared, the most stickiness was observed in the 
lowest-premium (i.e., safest) quintile and the least stickiness in the 
highest (i.e., riskiest) quintile. These results run contrary to the pre-
dictions of Riley's model. They also provide a robustness check of the 
main stickiness results, which prevail across different premia levels. 
One final insight from the stickiness analysis comes from examina-
tion of the raw data on PREM. The data reveal that banks at times 
extend loans with interest rates below the comparable risk-free rate. 
To investigate this, we identify loans for which the rate is at least 1 
percent below the comparable risk-free rate (i.e., PREM < - .01) to 
guard against overmeasuring negative premia lending. While these 
negative-premium loans are only 1.0 percent of the entire sample, 
their proportion varies directly with the interest rate cycle. They 
peaked at 7.0 percent of the sample when open-market rates were at 
their peak in 1982: 2, more than 70 times as high as in the mid 
to late 1980s when open-market rates were substantially lower. The 
incidence of negative-premia loans is also more than 10 times as great 
on fixed-rate loans as on floating-rate loans, 2.3 percent versus 0.2 
percent, respectively. These data are not consistent with extant theo-
ries of credit rationing, which require that banks earn a nonnegative 
expected economic profit on each loan by charging a rate sufficiently 
above the risk-free rate to compensate for expected credit losses. 
However, lending at a negative premium is consistent with other 
explanations of stickiness that recognize long-term lending relation-
ships, such as implicit interest rate insurance or recontracting with 
financially distressed borrowers. 
Overall, the stickiness results suggest that the empirical literature 
that equated stickiness with credit rationing may have been mis-
leading because of the lack of available information on specific loan 
contract terms. With the notable exception of some of the collateral 
results, the data generally do not support the currently available theo-
ries of credit rationing as the dominant explanations of the stickiness. 
Nearly half of the observed stickiness occurs on commitment loans 
that cannot be symptomatic of rationing of this pool of borrowers, 
since they are contractually protected from rationing. Similarly, the 
Copyright © 1992. All rights reserved.
CREDIT RATIONING 
portion of stickiness that is due to negative rate premia cannot reflect 
equilibrium credit rationing, which requires a nonnegative expected 
profit on each loan. The near-equality of stickiness on commitment 
and noncommitment loans casts additional doubt on whether infor-
mation problems are major causes of stickiness, given the evidence 
in the literature that commitment loans are relatively safe and are 
likely associated with relatively few information problems. In addi-
tion, the finding that loan rate premia generally do not decrease in 
response to alternative measures of credit market tightness also casts 
doubts on whether the observed stickiness is symptomatic of credit 
rationing. I? 
Proportions Test Results 
Tables 4 and 5 give the results for the proportions tests using real 
and nominal Treasury rates, respectively. The dependent variables 
are log-odds ratios (In[Y/(l - Y)]) for the three important loan char-
acteristics, COMMIT, COLLAT, and FLOAT. The exogenous vari-
ables are the same as those in the stickiness tests, except that all loan 
variables are size-duration weighted and no interaction terms are 
specified. Column I of tables 4 and 5 shows the regressions for the 
probabilities that a dollar-year of loans will be made under commit-
ment as functions of real and nominal rates, respectively; column 2 
of both tables adds the CRUNCH variable. As discussed above, 
if credit rationing is an important macroeconomic phenomenon, 
then it is a virtual necessary condition that the proportion of new 
loans issued under commitment be substantially higher when rates 
are high. As shown in the bottom section of column 1 in table 4, 
a doubling of real rates yields a .069 increase in the log-odds ratio 
In[COMMIT/(1 - COMMIT)). As also shown, this translates into an 
increase in the probability of COMMIT of 1.7 percent when evalu-
ated at the mean probability of COMMIT of 49.7 percent. 18 Note 
17 It is interesting to note that the type of stickiness found here does not appear to 
carryover to corporate bond rates, suggesting that bank loan rates may be special in 
this regard. Lamy and Thompson (1988) found that the rate premium on primary 
issue corporate bonds increased rather than decreased with Treasury rates in a model 
in which risk (as measured by bond ratings) was controlled for and interacted with 
changes in Treasury rates. Their procedure is similar to our interactions between loan 
contract features and TRA TE. 
18 The change in probability from changing exogenous variables in a logit equation 
is given by 
exp(Lo + AL) 
P -P - P 
1 0 - 1 + exp(Lo + AL) 0' 
where PI and Po are the new and initial probabilities, Lo is the log-odds ratio In[Po/(l -
Pol, and AL is the predicted change in the log-odds ratio from changing the exogenous 
variables. 
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TABLE 4 
GROUPED LO(:!'1' REGRESSIONS OF THE PROBAIlILiTIES OF DIFFERENT LOAN CONTRACT TER~1S ON REAL !1\TEREST RATES AND C01\TROL VARIABLES 
VARIABLE 
TRATER 
TRATER2 
CRUNCH 
COMMIT 
COLLA'!' 
FLOAT 
II' 
In[COMMIT/ 
(I - COMMIT)] 
1-
Cocfhcicnt Statistic 
(I) 
-2.H4D* -2.04 
65.5894** 5.90 
.0464 1.05 
.2896** 7.55 
.12 
In[COMMIT/ 
(I - COMMIT)] 
/-
Coefficient Statistic 
(2) 
-.9288 -.85 
61.3072** 5.49 
- .139:3** -1.28 
.0711 1.66 
.3019** 7.85 
.12 
In[COLLAT/ In[ciJLLAT/ In[FLOAT/ In[FLOAT/ 
(I - COLLAr)] (I - COLLA!,)] (I - FLOAT)] (I - FLOAT)] 
--~----<-.----~,-". 
1- /- I- I-
Coefflci{~nt Statistic Cocfftcicnl Statistic (:ocffkicnt Statistic Coefficient Statistic 
-_ .. _------ ----~-----.--
(3) (4) (5) (6) 
----------
-4.2401** -3.76 -6.1881** -5.36 .- 10.2090** -8.23 
-11.2191** -8.83 
153(;77 1.31 19.8048 1.69 83.9995** 6.59 86.1415** 6.78 
.2553** 7.70 .132:3** 3.64 
.1l31 ** 2.97 .1195** 3.15 .0826* 2.05 .0818* 2.03 
.8240'* 17.59 .7988** 16.87 
.4397** 13.38 .109:\** 12.40 
.17 .18 .09 
.09 
Simulated Effc<.:lS of an Increase in Credit Markel Tightness: 
Predicted Chan"e in Dependent Variable and I-Statistic from a Doubling of TRA TER from Its Mean (from .0250 to .(500) 
.0694** 6.19 .0917** 7.43 - .0772*' - 6.50 -.1176" -9.08 - .0077** -7.56 -.1184*' -8.39 
Change in the Probability of the Category at Its Mean from a Doubling of TRATER 
.0\73 .022U - .0193 - .0293 -- .02-11 - .0296 
Predicted Change in Dependent Variable and I-Statistic from a Credit Crunch (CRUNCH) 
I :~93" - ·1.28 ,2553** 7.70 .1323** 3.64 
Change ill the Probability of rill' Catq~ory at Its Mean from a Credit CrUll<:h 
- .0348 .0627 .0330 
;\;on",---Fa<. b ob~er\'ation n~prcs(:Ilt~ till' ~i/.{·-dlll "lion weighted t<Tm~ for a hank-date (Olllhinatioll. E,ICh dependent \rari<lblt~ is IIIII/( I - Y)l, where Y i:. the sizc-ciur'-\lion weighted proportion 
of IClam willi the :-.pcdfi<.~d contract l{~rlll.\. :\umucr (If ohservations is 12,67H. Illt('rn'l)t~ Wi'r(' indudcd for ('.u.:it bank in the sample. and tlH~ U'2's rcllcct the proportion of' variance explained <tftcr 
thc~c illlt'r("l'pt~, AI~() indwlcd but lIot shown an' the cOlltrol \'ari;lbk!'. I.:,\SIZE, L',nt.:RATIO~, DEYfA:\D, OVER:,\ICHT, Sl:\GFAM, MULTIFAM. NO~RES, L:\BA~KASSETS, 
(;I(I'(;RO\\'TII. c:-;nll'l.()Y. TnIE. and TI~IE2. 
>£< Stmislically signilicanl at the 5- percent le\'eI. tW(H.ideci. 
** Statislically ~ignifi(alll at tin.' I percent level, two-sided. 
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VARIABLE 
TRATEN 
TRATEN2 
CRUNCH 
COMMIT 
COLLAT 
FLOAT o R2 
O'l 
<.0 
TABLE 5 
GROUPED LOGIT REGRESSIONS OF THE PROBABILITIES OF DIFFERENT LOAN CONTRACT TERMS 
ON NOMINAL INTEREST RATES AND CONTROL VARIABLES 
In[COMMITI In[COMMITI In[COLLATI In[COLLATI In[FLOATI 
(1 - COMMIT)] (1 - COMMIT)] (1 - COLLAT)] (1 - COLLAT)] (1 - FLOAT)] 
t- t- t- t- t-
Coefficient Statistic Coefficient Statistic Coefficient Statistic Coefficient Statistic Coefficient Statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
-12.4111*- -6.03 -12.1075*' -5.87 2.0088 1.03 1.7832 .92 -9.3174-* -4.25 
53.8996*' 6.58 54.9265** 6.70 -17.6335* -2.25 -24.7333*' -3.14 40.6003** 4.64 
-.0857' -2.55 .3005** 8.59 
.1119" 2.94 .1153** 3.04 .0894' 2.21 
.0814 1.83 .0955' 2.13 .8828** 18.81 
.2832" 7.38 .2864** 7.47 .4663'* 14.28 .4486** 13.75 
.12 .12 .17 .18 .09 
Simulated Effects of an Increase in Credit Market Tightness: 
In[FLOATI 
(1 - FLOAT)] 
t-
Coefficient Statistic 
(6) 
-9.2991" -4.24 
40.9712" 4.67 
-.0169 -.44 
.0900' 2.22 
.8858'* 18.68 
.09 
Predicted Change in Dependent Variable and t-Statistic from Increasing TRATEN from Its Mean (.0859) by .0250 
-.0451** -3.13 - .0324* -2.13 -.0332* -2.16 -.0309 -1.91 - .0365** - 2.74 
Change in the PrObability of the Category at Its Mean from Increasing TRA TEN by .0250 
-.0113 -.0081 -.0083 -.0077 - .0091 
Predicted Change in Dependent Variable and I-Statistic from a Credit Crunch (CRUNCH) 
-.0857* -2.55 .3005'* 8.59 
Change in the Probability of the Category at Its Mean from a Credit Crunch 
-.0214 .0735 
NOTE.-See note to table 4. 
* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level, two-sided. 
** Statistically Significant at the 1 percent level, two-sided. 
-.0771** -5.46 
-.0193 
-.0169 -.44 
-.0042 
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that this 1.7 percent is effectively an estimate of the maximum effect 
of a doubling of real rates, since the logit specification yields the 
maximum derivatives at a 50 percent probability, with smaller effects 
toward the limiting probabilities of zero and 100 percent. The 
CRUNCH variable in column 2 of table 4 again goes in the opposite 
direction of that predicted by rationing and actually has a larger 
absolute effect (- 3.5 percent) than the doubling of real rates. Simi-
larly, when the rate of real or nominal aggregate loan growth was 
substituted for TRA TER, the predicted effect from decreasing loan 
growth from the mean to zero actually reduced the probability of 
COMMIT, contrary to the implications of credit rationing (not 
shown). The effects of nominal rates shown in columns 1 and 2 of 
table 5 show a decrease in the probability of COMMIT of about 1 
percent, with both CRUNCH and nominal loan growth (not shown) 
also predicting a decrease in COMMIT when markets are tight. Thus 
in all but one of six cases, the COMMIT probability moves in the 
opposite direction of that predicted by rationing theory, and the one 
exception is a very small increase. 
Figure 2 illustrates the relationships between the COMMIT/NOK-
COMMIT ratio and Treasury rates over time. The solid lines in the 
figure connect the size-duration weighted averages of the COMMITI 
KONCOMMIT ratio for each time period, and the broken lines con-
nect the weighted averages of TRA TER and TRA TEN. The ratio 
is negatively correlated with both real and nominal rates over the 
1979: 4-1982 : 4 period and is either positively correlated or uncorre-
lated with open-market rates for the remainder of the sample. This 
runs counter to the empirical predictions of the credit rationing hy-
pothesis since cyclical rationing would be most likely to appear during 
the volatile period in which real interest rates went up and down 
from their sample maximum levels. However, it should be noted that 
when the sample was split into early and late subsamples and the 
regressions were rerun (not shown), the computed effects of TRA TE 
on COMMIT/NONCOMMIT remained about the same as those re-
ported in tables 4 and 5, apparently because of changes in the control 
variables. 19 
For additional evidence, the COMMIT regressions in tables 4 and 
5 were also rerun using as dependent variables the quantities of com-
mitment and noncommitment loans in place of the log-odds ratios 
(not reported in the tables). Both types of loans were found to be 
increasing in the interest rate, suggesting that both commitment and 
noncommitment borrowers are able to obtain funding when rates are 
19 The fact that the results hold up by subsample also lessens concern over the 
possible non stationarity of the COMMIT ratio over the late subsample. 
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FIG. 2.-Ratio of commitment to noncommitment bank loans and Treasury rates of 
the same duration (1977:1-1988:2): a, real Treasury rates; b, nominal Treasury rates. 
high. Thus even if some noncommitment borrower pools are subject 
to rationing, these data suggest that other noncommitment borrower 
pools increase their borrowing, more than offsetting any rationing 
effect in the aggregate.20 
The log·odds and quantity COMMIT regressions together suggest 
that information-based, equilibrium credit rationing, if it exists, may 
be relatively small and economically insignificant. The one small in-
20 The log·odds logit formulation is still preferred to using the quantities as depen-
dent variables because the logit form automatically controls for any variables that affect. 
the overall level of lending by the bank. 
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crease in the commitment proportion from a doubling of real interest 
rates is counteracted by the opposite findings when nominal interest 
rates, CRUNCH, or loan growth is specified and by the finding that 
the quantity of noncommitment loans actually increases with both 
real and nominal rates. In addition, as discussed above, there are two 
other related explanations that are just as likely to account for the 
single small commitment proportion increase. First, when market 
rates are high, borrowers who have both commitment and non-
commitment funding capacities may switch from noncommitment to 
commitment sources to avoid rationing. Second, borrowers may take 
out more commitment contracts when rates are rising to avoid ra-
tioning. Thus the one small increase in the commitment proportion 
when real open-market rates increase may indicate that Stiglitz and 
Weiss-type information problems are operative, but the extent to 
which they result in rationing or just more commitment protection 
from rationing is not identified. 
The results and conclusions drawn here are somewhat in conflict 
with those of Sofianos et al. (1990), but this conflict is likely due to 
methodological differences and the fact that they used only aggregate 
data. Sofianos et al. ran vector autoregressive models of the dollar 
stocks (as opposed to new flows) of commitment and noncommitment 
loans aggregated from a sample of banks. They found that with lags 
of the interest rate included in the regressions, the coefficients of the 
lagged money stock were statistically significant in predicting (i.e., 
Granger-caused) noncommitment loans but were not statistically sig-
nificant in predicting (i.e., did not Granger-cause) commitment loans. 
Sofia nos et al. took this as evidence that a rationing channel acts on 
noncommitment loans but not on commitment loans. In subsequent 
runs provided by those authors, however, the sum of the lagged coef-
ficients of the money stock was positive and statistically significant for 
commitment loans and negative and insignificant for noncom mit-
ment loans. These additional results conflict with a conclusion of 
credit rationing since it is noncommitment loans rather than commit-
ment loans that should increase with the money stock for a given 
interest rate under rationing. To investigate these implications fur-
ther, we reran our log-odds COMMIT models, adding lagged 
changes in the real money stock as exogenous variables (not shown 
in the tables). The sums of the money lags were positive and signifi-
cant when real interest rates were included as regressors (positive 
and insignificant when nominal rates were included), again running 
contrary to the predictions of credit rationing. 
Columns 3 and 4 of tables 4 and 5 show that the probability of 
collateralized borrowing decreases by about 1-2 percent when open-
market rates increase by 2.5 percent. Again, CRUNCH has the oppo-
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site effect of market rates. These findings are consistent with the 
stickiness results, which suggested that even after the pledging pro-
cess, the remaining information problems are greater than average 
for the pools of borrowers in which collateral is pledged. These re-
sults also suggest that to the extent that rationing occurs, secured 
borrowers are more often rationed than unsecured borrowers. How-
ever, rerunning the regressions using the quantities of secured and 
unsecured loans as the dependent variables in place of the log-odds 
ratio (not shown in the tables) indicated that both secured and unse-
cured loans tend to increase when rates are high. This suggests that 
the rationing of secured borrowers, if it occurs, may not have much 
macroeconomic significance since other secured borrowers appar-
ently make up the difference by increasing their borrowing. 
The final columns in tables 4 and 5 show the regressions for the 
probability of FLOAT. The results show a small decrease in the 
FLOAT proportion of about 1-3 percent when open-market rates 
increase by 2.5 percent. This provides some weak evidence for the 
implicit interest rate insurance hypothesis to the extent that a fixed-
rate loan is a superior vehicle to a floating-rate loan for providing 
this insurance. Rerunning the regressions using the quantities of 
floating-rate and fixed-rate loans as dependent variables (not shown 
in the tables) yielded a prediction that both types of loans increase 
with open-market rates. 
Overall, the proportions tests suggest that credit rationing of com-
mercial bank loan customers is not likely to be an important macro-
economic phenomenon. The proportion of new loans issued under 
commitment does not increase substantially when real rates rise and 
actually decreases when most of the measures of credit market tight-
ness increase, despite the fact that rationing can occur only by de-
creasing noncommitment loans. Moreover, the slight increase in the 
commitment proportion in the real rate regression appears to come 
about not because of a decrease in noncommitment loans, but simply 
because noncommitment loans increase by less than commitment 
loans do when interest rates increase. Increases in the money stock 
for a given interest rate also tend to increase commitment loans more 
than noncommitment loans, again contrary to the predictions of 
credit rationing. 
Finally, we note that both the stickiness and proportions tests were 
subjected to a number of robustness checks beyond those reported 
above. The regressions were rerun using data from 1977 through 
1983, leaving off the 1984-88 period, when it is generally agreed 
that rationing would be less severe or nonexistent. The results were 
qualitatively unaffected by this data omission. The stickiness regres-
sions were rerun using the 3-month Treasury rate for every loan 
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rather than the comparable Treasury rate for the loan, and most of 
the results were similar. The stickiness regressions were also rerun 
with the TRA TE variable interacted with LNSIZE, and with dummy 
variables for whether rates were increasing or decreasing. These in-
teractions did not change the results qualitatively.21 The proportions 
regressions for the three key contract terms were also rerun with 
each of the other two contract terms excluded as regressors, with no 
qualitative change in results. 
IV. Conclusions 
This paper has examined the empirical significance of information-
based, equilibrium credit rationing of commercial bank loan custom-
ers by focusing on specific elements of the commercial loan contract. 
Such an analysis is suggested by the extant theories of credit ra-
tioning, which offer a variety of testable implications vis-a-vis specific 
loan contract features, particularly commitments. Earlier empirical 
studies have been unable to examine these implications because infor-
mation on loan contract features has generally been unavailable. 
Our major empirical results and their implications are summarized 
in table 6. As in earlier studies, our results suggest that the commer-
cial loan rate is sticky with respect to open-market rates, consistent 
with rationing. In contrast to other studies, however, use of the data 
on the key loan contract terms suggests that most of the stickiness 
does not reflect credit rationing. Nearly half of the observed loan rate 
stickiness occurs on loans made to commitment borrowers, who are 
contractually protected from rationing. Some of the remaining sticki-
ness involves loans whose rate premia actually become negative when 
open-market rates are high, which also cannot be symptomatic of 
equilibrium credit rationing. Also in contrast to other studies, we are 
able to verify the robustness of our results using alternative measures 
of credit market tightness. 
The most compelling evidence on rationing concerns the propor-
tion of new loans made under commitment. Rationing requires that 
the fraction of new loans under commitment rise when open-market 
rates are high, since noncommitment borrowers are rationed and 
commitment borrowers are not. Our results suggest that this phe-
nomenon does not occur to any great extent, and, in fact, the commit-
ment ratio decreases with most of our measures of credit market 
tightness. The data also indicate that all types of commercial loans, 
21 The TR-L~SIZE interaction had a positive coefficient, consistent with the hypoth-
esis that smaller loans may have more information problems that are reflected in a 
larger degree of rate stickiness. 
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TABLE 6 
SUMMARY OF MAJOR EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
Result Implication 
A. Stickiness Tests 
1. General stickiness. Loan rate premia 
over Treasury rates of equal dura-
tion decrease substantially with open-
-market rates 
2. Commitment loan rates nearly as 
sticky as noncommitment rates. Also, 
some of the observed stickiness oc-
curs on loans with negative premia 
over risk-free rates 
3. Fixed-rate loans have much stickier 
rates than floating-rate loans 
4. Secured loans have slightly stickier 
rates than unsecured loans 
5. Loan rate premia generally do not 
decrease with other measures of 
credit market tightness (CRUNCH 
or reduced aggregate loan growth) 
6. Loan rate stickiness prevails over all 
risk class quintiles (as measured by 
rate premia) 
Consistent with credit rationing, im-
plicit interest rate insurance, or recon-
tracting with troubled borrowers 
Much of the stickiness cannot be ex-
plained by credit rationing since com-
mitment borrowers cannot be ra-
tioned, and negative premia are 
inconsistent with equilibrium ra-
tioning theories 
Consistent with implicit interest rate in-
surance hypothesis 
Consistent with credit rationing since 
collateral is more often required 
from riskier, more information-
problematic borrower pools 
Credit rationing, if it occurs, does not 
play an important role during pe-
riods of overall credit market 
tightness 
Inconsistent with Riley (1987) version 
of credit rationing, in which only the 
observably riskiest pools are rationed. 
B. Proportions Tests 
1. Commitment proportion of new 
loans does not increase substantially 
with real open-market rates and de-
creases with nominal rates and other 
measures of market tightness 
2. The quantities of both new commit-
ment loans and new noncom mit-
ment loans increase with open-
market rates 
3. Commitment proportion of new 
loans increases with lagged money 
stock, given interest rates 
4. Collateral proportion of new loans 
decreases slightly with open-market 
rates, but quantities of both new se-
cured and new unsecured loans in-
crease 
5. Fixed-rate proportion of new loans 
increases slightly with market rates 
Inconsistent with credit rationing hav-
ing macroeconomic significance be-
cause only non commitment borrow-
ers can be rationed 
Inconsistent with credit rationing hav-
ing macroeconomic significance. If 
some noncommitment borrowers are 
rationed, others increase borrowing 
and make up for it 
Inconsistent with credit rationing, 
which predicts that money channel 
(Le., rationing) affects only non-
commitment loans 
Consistent with greater relative ra-
tioning of riskier borrowers, but oth-
ers increase borrowing, and make up 
for it 
Consistent with implicit interest rate in-
surance hypothesis 
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including noncommitment loans, tend to increase in quantity during 
periods of high interest rates. This suggests that to the extent that 
some borrowers may be rationed, others take their places and receive 
bank loans. Taken together, the results in this paper do not rule 
out the existence of information-based equilibrium credit rationing 
of commercial bank borrowers, but they make it difficult to argue 
that such rationing constitutes an important macroeconomic phe-
nomenon. 
References 
Avery, Robert B., and Berger, Allen N. "Loan Commitments and Bank Risk 
Exposure." J. Banking and Finance 15 (February 1991): 173-92. 
Berger, Allen N., and Udell, Gregory F. "Some Evidence on the Empirical 
Significance of Credit Rationing." Finance and Economics Discussion Se-
ries, no. 105. Washington: Bd. Governors, Fed. Reserve System, December 
1989. 
---. "Collateral, Loan Quality, and Bank Risk."]. Monetary £Con. 25 (Janu-
arv 1990): 21-42. 
--' -. "Securitization, Risk, and the Liquidity Problem in Banking." In 
Structural Change in Banking, edited by Michael Klausner and Lawrence J. 
White. Homewood, Ill.: Irwin, 1992, in press. 
Berkovitch, Elazar, and Greenbaum, Stuart I. "The Loan Commitment as an 
Optimal Financing Contract." ]. Financial and Quantitative Analysis 26 
(March 1991): 83-95. 
Besanko, David, and Thakor, Anjan V. "Collateral and Rationing: Sorting 
Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets." Internal. Econ. 
Rev. 28 (October 1987): 671-89. (a) 
---. "Competitive Equilibrium in the Credit Market under Asymmetric 
Information." J. Econ. Theory 42 (June 1987): 167-82. (b) 
Bester, Helmut. "Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect 
Information." A.E.R. 75 (September 1985): 850-55. 
Blinder, Alan S., and Stiglitz, Joseph E. "Money, Credit Constraints, and 
Economic Activity." A.E.R. Papers and Proc. 73 (May 1983): 297-302. 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. "Senior Loan Officer 
Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices." Washington: Brl. Governors, 
Fed. Reserve System, May 1988. 
Boot, Arnoud W. A., and Thakor, Anjan V. "Dynamic Equilibrium in a 
Competitive Credit Market: Intertemporal Contracting as Insurance 
against Rationing." Working paper. Bloomington: Indiana Univ., August 
1989. 
Boot, Arnoud W. A.; Thakor, Anjan V.; and Udell, Gregory F. "Competition, 
Risk Neutrality and Loan Commitments."]' Banking and Finance 11 (Sep-
tember 1987): 449-71. 
Chan, Yuk-Shee, and Kanatas, George. "Asymmetric Valuations and the Role 
of Collateral in Loan Agreements."]' Money, Credit and Banking 17 (Febru-
ary 1985): 84-95. 
Duca, John V., and Rosenthal, Stuart S. "An Empirical Test of Credit Ra-
tioning in the Mortgage Market." J. Urban Econ. 29 (March 1991): 218-34. 
Eckstein, Otto, and Sinai, Alan. "The Mechanisms of the Business Cycle in 
Copyright © 1992. All rights reserved.
CREDIT RATIONING 1077 
the Postwar Era." In The American Business: Continuity and Change, edited 
by Robert]. Gordon. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press (for NBER), 1986. 
Fried, Joel, and Howitt, Peter. "Credit Rationing and Implicit Contract The-
ory." J. Money, Credit and Banking 12 (August 1980): 471-87. 
Goldfeld, Steven M. Commercial Bank Behavior and Economic Activity: A Struc-
tural Study of Monetary Policy in the Postwar United States. Amsterdam: North-
Holland, 1966. 
Hendershott, Patrie H. "Real User Costs and the Demand for Single-Family 
Housing." Brookings Papers Econ. Activity, no. 2 (1980), pp. 401-44. 
Jaffee, Dwight M. Credit Rationing and the Commercial Loan Market. New York: 
Wiley, 1971. 
Jaffee, Dwight M., and Rosen, Kenneth T. "Mortgage Credit Availability and 
Residential Construction." Brookings Papers Econ. Activity, no. 2 (1979), pp. 
333-76. 
Jaffee, Dwight M., and Russell, Thomas. "Imperfect Information, Uncer-
tainty, and Credit Rationing." QJ.E. 90 (November 1976): 651-66. 
Kanatas, George. "Commercial Paper, Bank Reserve Requirements, and the 
Informational Role of Loan Commitments." J. Banking and Finance 11 (Sep-
tember 1987): 425-48. 
Kareken,John H. "Lenders' Preferences, Credit Rationing, and the Effective-
ness of Monetary Policy." Rev. Econ. and Statis. 39 (August 1957): 292-302. 
King, Stephen R. "Monetary Transmission: Through Bank Loans or Bank 
Liabilities?" J. Money, Credit and Banking 18 (August 1986): 290-303. 
Lamy, Robert E., and Thompson, G. Rodney. "Risk Premia and the Pricing 
of Primary Issue Bonds." J. Banking and Finance 12 (December 1988): 
585-601. 
Melnik, Arie, and Plaut, Steven E. "Loan Commitment Contracts, Terms of 
Lending, and Credit Allocation." J. Finance 41 (June 1986): 425-35. 
Riley, John G. "Credit Rationing: A Further Remark." A.E.R. 77 (March 
1987): 224-27. 
Rosen, Harvey S., and Rosen, Kenneth T. "Federal Taxes and Homeown-
ership: Evidence from Time Series." J.P.E. 88 (February 1980): 59-75. 
Scott, Ira 0., Jr. "The Availability Doctrine: Theoretical Underpinnings." 
Rev. Econ. Studies 25 (October 1957): 41-48. 
Sharpe, Steven A. "Credit Rationing, Concessionary Lending, and Debt Ma-
turity." J. Banking and Finance 15 (June 1991): 581-604. 
Slovin, Myron B., and Sushka, Marie E. "A Model of the Commercial Loan 
Rate." J. Finance 38 (December 1983): 1583-96. 
Sofianos, George; Wachtel, Paul A.; and Melnik, Arie. "Loan Commitments 
and Monetary Policy." J. Banking and Finance 14 (October 1990): 677-89. 
Stiglitz, Joseph E., and Weiss, Andrew. "Credit Rationing in Markets with 
Imperfect Information." A.E.R. 71 (June 1981): 393-410. 
--. "Credit Rationing: Reply." A.E.R. 77 (March 1987): 228-31. 
Thakor, Anjan V., and Udell, Gregory F. "An Economic Rationale for the 
Pricing Structure of Bank Loan Commitments." J. Banking and Finance 11 
(June 1987): 271-89. 
Wette, Hildegard C. "Collateral in Credit Rationing in Markets with Imper-
fect Information: Note." A.E.R. 73 (June 1983): 442-45. 
Williamson, Stephen D. "Costly Monitoring, Loan Contracts, and Equilibrium 
Credit Rationing." QJ.E. 102 (February 1987): 135-45. 
